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LIBERTARIANISM, UTILITY, AND ECONOMIC 
COMPETITION 
Jonathan Wolff∗
INTRODUCTION 
IBERTARIANISM is commonly characterized both by its in-
stitutions and by its foundations. Institutionally, it is associated 
with the idea of a minimal state,
1 restricted to the narrow functions 
of protecting citizens from each other (and from non-citizens), and 
providing for the enforcement of private contracts. Typically, liber-
tarians assume that this is necessarily accompanied by the eco-
nomic institutions of a pure form of capitalism, including strong 
private property rights, low or no taxation, and free competition 
among potential producers of goods and services.
2
L 
Libertarianism can take various forms, but here I want to con-
trast what I shall call “deontological libertarianism,” and “conse-
quentialist libertarianism.” Deontological libertarianism, pio-
neered by Robert Nozick, is based on a strict doctrine of natural 
rights, violation of which is never permitted, whatever the conse-
quences.
3 The justification for such a theory is claimed to be a par-
ticular rights-based theory of justice.
4 Proponents of consequential-
ist libertarianism, by contrast, argue for the free market and strong 
individual rights to property, not on the basis of an antecedent the-
∗ University College London, Department of Philosophy. I am very grateful to Hil-
lel Steiner, Chandran Kukathas, Roger Crisp, John O’Neill, Michael Otsuka, and the 
participants in the Symposium on Contemporary Political Theory and Private Law at 
the University of Virginia School of Law for their comments. 
1 Nozickian libertarianism, of course, allows people voluntarily to contract into a 
more than minimal state, if that is what they wish to do. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia 318–20 (1974). For present purposes I ignore “left-libertarianism,” 
which combines principles of individual liberty with restrictions on the type of prop-
erty rights individuals may form. See Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism Without Ine-
quality 114–31 (2003); Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights 268 (1994); Peter Vallen-
tyne, Introduction: Left-Libertarianism—A Primer, in Left-Libertarianism and Its 
Critics: The Contemporary Debate 1, 15–16 (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 
2000). 
2 Loren E. Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community 125–26 (1987). 
3 See Nozick, supra note 1, at ix–xi. 
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ory of justice, but in terms of the beneficial consequences such as 
wealth creation and efficiency that such arrangements may bring. 
Pure consequentialist libertarianism is rare, if it exists at all, but 
there are hybrid forms of libertarianism that combine deontologi-
cal and consequentialist reasoning. 
Often, advocates of hybrid views are less theoretically self-
conscious than their deontological colleagues, appealing to various 
considerations without investigating the relations between them or 
the further consequences of adopting the doctrines in question.
5 
Consequentialist libertarianism, whether consequentialist in whole 
or in part, thus offers a hostage to fortune and is open to lines of 
criticism based on the calculation of consequences. So, for exam-
ple, if a new version of market socialism could be devised that had 
all the benefits of capitalism and some others as well, fully conse-
quentialist libertarians would seem bound, in theory at least, to re-
ject capitalism in favor of this alternative theory. Those holding a 
hybrid view would have to decide where their loyalties lie. 
Thus, to those of a certain cast of mind, deontological libertari-
anism, with its austere ontology of moral premises, appears the 
more rigorous, appealing, and defensible version. My aim here is 
very simple; it is to argue that deontological libertarianism cannot 
easily deliver the defense of capitalism that it aspires to deliver, or 
at least not in a way that avoids begging the question. The case of 
economic competition will provide a helpful demonstration. 
I should stress that I do not wish to argue that this is the most se-
rious weakness of libertarianism, and I accept that there are other 
points where significant criticisms can be made. My point is only 
that this is a weakness that seems to have been overlooked. Nine-
teenth-century thinkers such as John Stuart Mill saw economic 
competition as a problem, and they used consequentialist argu-
ments to defend it.
6 Somehow we have lost sight of the problem 
since then, perhaps because we think Mill answered it. But, of 
course, those that reject consequentialist reasoning, such as deon-
tological libertarians, are not entitled to avail themselves of Mill’s 
5 See generally Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962). Friedman uses a 
combination of arguments, some apparently based on fundamental principles of free-
dom, see id. at 12, and others based on consequentialist reasoning, see id. at 131–32. 
6 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism and On Liberty 163–64 (Mary War-
nock ed., Blackwell Publishing 2d ed. 2003) (1859). WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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solution and so need an independent one of their own. It is this 
that has been lacking. 
I. ECONOMIC COMPETITION 
Free economic competition is essentially equivalent to the idea 
of “no entry barriers.” Anyone may, in principle, offer for sale any 
good or service. Of course, financial constraints may make it im-
possible in practice for someone to compete in particular areas, but 
a system of free competition places no legal restrictions on indi-
viduals producing or offering for sale any good or service. In any 
developed economy, economic competition takes a number of 
forms. H.B. Acton usefully distinguished four spheres of economic 
competition in a capitalist economy: (1) for contracts; (2) between 
suppliers of labor; (3) between employers of labor; and (4) to sell 
to consumers.
7 Quite likely this is not an exhaustive (or, indeed, ex-
clusive) classification, but it will serve to illustrate the scope of 
competition. 
Economic competition is, of course, celebrated for a number of 
reasons. One set of considerations derives from ideas of freedom; 
simply the freedom to produce, buy, and sell what one wishes. 
Those who, for some reason, are prohibited from one or more of 
these activities may feel deeply frustrated. As Nozick famously put 
it, “The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts be-
tween consenting adults.”
8 This thought can be taken in a number 
of directions: as a complaint against the suppression of liberty, for 
instance; or, perhaps, as a complaint against the violation of rights. 
In sum, however, the freedom arguments for competition focus on 
the rights and liberties of producers and sellers of goods. 
A second set of considerations points to the economic advan-
tages of competition. Free competition is the enemy of compla-
cency. In a competitive environment, there is no opportunity to re-
lax, for this may allow one’s competitors to innovate by either 
producing a better product or finding a cheaper way of producing 
or selling existing products. Competition thus keeps producers and 
retailers on their toes. The need for economic survival against 
7 H.B. Acton, The Morals of Markets and Related Essays 71–79 (David Gordon & 
Jeremy Shearmur eds., Liberty Fund 1993) (1971). 
8 See Nozick, supra note 1, at 163. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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competition keeps prices down and quality up. This, quite obvi-
ously, is to the advantage of the consumer, and provides a very 
powerful consequentialist argument for competition. 
  Yet despite the common lauding of economic competition, his-
torically the arguments have not all been one way. Economic com-
petition, and competitive behavior in general, has been the object 
of moral concern for many reasons, although I think we can divide 
those reasons into four main groups: (1) that the competitive indi-
vidual displays an unattractive character; (2) that social relations in 
a competitive society are in some way impoverished; (3) that com-
petition involves treating people as means; and (4) that competi-
tion harms those who take part, and in particular those who lose. 
For the purposes of this Essay, I want to discuss only the last of 
these categories.
9 Here the general point is familiar. Economic 
competition will have at least three types of losers: (1) producers 
that find they can no longer sell their goods;
10 (2) workers that lose 
their jobs owing to business failure or through direct or indirect 
competition with other workers (perhaps in low wage economies);
11 
and (3) in different cases, consumers that find themselves “priced 
out of the market” (for example, the housing market). 
Historically, of these groups the second has been of the most 
concern, and for very good reason. Thus Bentham, for example, 
when advocating the introduction of the printing press in Tripoli 
and Greece, warned that “care should be taken that the employ-
ment given to it should not be such as to throw out of employment 
any of the existing scribes, except in so far as other employment 
9 Although there is much to be said on the other side, Acton competently argues 
that the alleged harms of the first two types are not significant. See Acton, supra note 
7, at 67–71, 96–98. Acton does not discuss the third type. Elsewhere I have argued 
that economic competition can involve a form of exploitation: exploitation by con-
sumers (who are also voters) of those engaged in competition. Jonathan Wolff, The 
ethics of competition, in 3 The Legal and Moral Aspects of International Trade 82, 
93–95 (Asif Qureshi et al. eds., 1998).  
10 This would also include retailers who find themselves holding stock they cannot 
sell. 
11 Direct competition is to compete for the same jobs; indirect competition is to offer 
oneself as a worker to a business that will eventually destroy the jobs of others 
through successful competition. It is possible that different moral considerations apply 
in these cases, but I will not pursue that here. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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not less advantageous is found for them.”
12 For Bentham, care 
needs to be taken both to avoid the distress caused to the poten-
tially unemployed and the likely hostility to innovation consequent 
on such distress. 
Presumably, Bentham was thinking of scribes working in gov-
ernment service. But consider a private individual, running a copy-
ing service which employs scribes. Imagine now that another indi-
vidual has access to greater funds and decides to set up a printing 
press in competition. In one stroke, let us suppose, this will destroy 
the hand-copying business. In the economic “survival of the fit-
test,” this business will die out, possibly with the consequent finan-
cial ruin of its proprietor in addition to the unemployment of the 
scribes. Like Bentham, we will be concerned about the now-
unemployed scribes. Additionally, however, what, morally, should 
our attitude be to the loss, or even ruin, of the proprietor? 
One likely response is that this is simply a fact of economic life. 
This could mean one of at least two things. First, it could be that 
there is no alternative to an economic system with effects of this 
nature. This seems to me highly doubtful (as I shall illustrate be-
low
13), but in any case it is something that needs to be shown, 
rather than assumed. Second, it could mean that this is simply a 
natural consequence of the economic rules we happen to have. 
While that may be true, the question is whether we should have 
those rules. Thus, the “fact of economic life” defense takes us no-
where. 
No one can reasonably doubt that when a business fails, people 
suffer harm, often of a serious kind. Considering similar cases, Ac-
ton admits that, while the idea of the survival of the fittest applies 
to economic life as well as to evolutionary biology, there is an im-
portant disanalogy that makes it less serious in economics: losers in 
the biological struggle for survival face a drastic end, but when a 
form of economic life comes to an end, it does not necessarily in-
volve the ending of biological life.
14 Rather, it is merely the “cessa-
12 Jeremy Bentham, Securities Against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings 
for Tripoli and Greece 38 (Philip Schofield ed., Clarendon Press 1990) (1822). I thank 
Philip Schofield for drawing my attention to this text and to other writings on compe-
tition by Bentham. 
13 See infra Part V. 
14 Acton, supra note 7, at 72–73. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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tion of some groupings and activities and the assumption and or-
ganisation of new ones.”
15  
However calm and reassuring this may sound, one cannot help 
but feel that Acton has evaded the main theoretical question. 
When the printing press is introduced, those businesses that do not 
convert to the new technology will cease trading, and perhaps face 
financial ruin. Their financial interests will be destroyed, just as 
surely as they would have been had a rival businessman burned 
down the premises,
16 or if an employee disappeared with the year’s 
takings, or if an agent fraudulently diverted revenue into her own 
bank account. Thus, loss by competition, arson, theft, and fraud 
can, in principle, involve the same level and type of loss, at least 
from the point of view of the person who loses. This point is easily 
overlooked. We have somehow come to believe that a financial 
loss caused by fraud, theft, or arson is morally unacceptable, but a 
financial loss of the same magnitude resulting from economic com-
petition is merely unfortunate. 
It might be suggested that losses in economic competition differ 
in that the risks are voluntarily taken, whereas this is not the case 
for fraud, theft, and arson. Thus, those who draw a line between 
chance and choice, and consequently hold individuals responsible 
for the effects of their choices, may suppose they can explain the 
asymmetry. There may be some plausibility to this, although one 
possible reply is that the plausibility of such a distinction depends 
on falsely assimilating many different types of risk.
17 A closer ex-
amination, however, reveals that this argument fails to explain fully 
the distinction between loss through economic competition and 
loss through other means. A person who knowingly moves to a 
high-crime area to take advantage of the lower property prices still 
has rights against theft; the businessman who, perhaps reasonably 
under the circumstances, fails to anticipate shifting technologies 
does not thereby gain rights of protection. 
15 Id. at 73. He does, however, concede that it can lead to suicide or death by hunger. 
Id. 
16 I ignore any issues of insurance or redress. In the case of arson, even if insurance 
or compensation is paid out, this does not show that arson is morally permissible. 
17 See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Equality, Option Luck, and Responsibility, 111 
Ethics 548, 551–53 (2001); see also Michael Otsuka, Liberty, Equality, Envy, and Ab-
straction, in Dworkin and His Critics 70, 75 (Justine Burley ed., 2004). WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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Under capitalism, one is given rights against loss by fraud, theft, 
or arson, but not against loss by competition. This cries out for ex-
planation. The fact that no one need die hardly explains why in one 
case the loss is considered a normal part of life, but not in the other 
three cases. No one need die in ordinary cases of fraud, theft, or ar-
son (although they might, especially in the last), and the fact that 
people normally manage to carry on with some form of economic 
activity after suffering competitive losses hardly shows that those 
losses are not of significant moral concern. After all, fraud, theft, 
and arson do not bring the economy to a halt either. 
II. THE LIBERTY ARGUMENT 
One common attempted defense of free competition, from a lib-
eral or deontological libertarian perspective, is to say that the right 
to engage in economic competition is a simple implication of the 
right to liberty.
18 The right to liberty gives people a right to trade, 
buy, and sell as they wish. Hence competition is entirely unprob-
lematic. 
It should already be clear, though, what it is wrong with this ar-
gument. The right to liberty is never a right to act in all the ways 
one might wish, including ways that harm others. My right to lib-
erty does not give me the right to choose exactly how I will use my 
automatic machine gun, or even my petrol and matches. Deonto-
logical libertarians accept that, in general, there is no liberty to act 
in ways that violate the rights of others.
19 So, if economic competi-
tion does harm people, as John Stuart Mill argued, then no simple 
appeal to liberty will explain why it is permitted. What needs to be 
demonstrated is that this is a form of harm that does not violate 
rights, and this requires a deeper explanation than an appeal to lib-
erty. Such an appeal presupposes precisely what needs to be 
shown: that no violation of rights takes place. 
18 Or at least this is a common response to the arguments of this paper when it has 
been presented at conferences. There may be few, if any, published versions of this 
response, as economic competition is so rarely thought of as in need of defense. 
19 See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 1, at 171. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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III. THE CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENT 
No doubt the blindingly obvious thing to say is that we allow 
economic competition on consequentialist grounds, and indeed this 
is Mill’s own argument. The unfortunate financial loss of those 
running an obsolete or inefficient business is the downside of a sys-
tem with a lot of good to it, as discussed above. This is a reason for 
allowing competition: the economic analog of the “best of all pos-
sible worlds” defense to the problem of evil. Whether those that 
lose out should be given compensation, some sort of safety net, or 
nothing at all will depend on the further features of the consequen-
tialist theory one holds, together with a calculation of the conse-
quences. But giving people rights to be protected against economic 
competition—as distinct from rights to be given relief from the 
worst effects of economic competition—is bound to be inefficient in 
important ways, and thus it is not a viable option for a consequen-
tialist. The benefits of capitalism—innovation and cheap, high 
quality goods—depend on competition, and so restricting eco-
nomic competition is likely to lead to a very significant loss of these 
advantages. 
My first main point can now easily be appreciated. We are owed 
an explanation of why contemporary capitalism provides rights 
against fraud, theft, and arson, but not rights against economic 
competition. Standard arguments appealing to considerations such 
as the advantages of economic efficiency are available only to 
those that can avail themselves of those arguments. This will in-
clude almost everyone except the pure deontological libertarian. 
This, I hope, is a surprising conclusion: those who (apparently) 
speak most in favor of the free market and free competition are, 
prima facie, in the worst possible position to defend it. It thus re-
mains unclear, at this point, whether libertarians can even allow 
pure capitalism, still less that libertarianism provides a defense for 
it. 
What else might be said to reconnect deontological libertarian-
ism and capitalism? The only direct discussion of any relevance to 
the issue I have seen is by Richard Arneson.
20 In a discussion of 
Lockean self-ownership, Arneson is interested in the Lockean un-
20 See Richard J. Arneson, Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demolition, 39 Pol. 
Stud. 36 (1991). WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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derstanding of the concept of “harm to others.” He notes a number 
of nuances in the Lockean view, including that “[h]urts that come 
about by fair competition do not qualify as harms.”
21 This is exactly 
the doctrine that deontological libertarianism needs. (While the 
consequentialist can allow that economic competition causes harm 
but argue that this harm is outweighed by the consequent benefits, 
the deontological libertarian cannot.) To defend this doctrine, Ar-
neson points out that, in the absence of long-term contracts, cus-
tomers have a right to withdraw their custom for any reason or no 
reason.
22 Now, it is not clear from the context whether Arneson 
thinks this is a good defense, but it is also not entirely clear how 
this is supposed to function as a defense at all. Consider our case of 
the hand-copying business. Here the businessman complains that 
the printing press has harmed him by luring away customers. To 
this Arneson would reply that the customers could have left for 
other reasons if they had wanted to leave. This may be true, but it 
is far from clear that it is relevant. After all, it is not being claimed 
that the customers did leave for other reasons; merely that they 
could have legitimately done so if they wanted. But this does not an-
swer the point that, in the circumstances as they are, harm has been 
caused by another person setting up a competing business. 
Perhaps the argument is a different one. The operative claim 
may be that one cannot complain about the damage caused by 
economic competition, because the damage is exactly equivalent to 
damage that could have been caused by a means already acknowl-
edged as perfectly legitimate: customers withdrawing their trade on 
a whim. 
There are two possible types of reply to this argument. The first 
is that it is double edged; perhaps we should investigate whether it 
really should be legitimate for customers to withdraw their busi-
ness just because they feel like it. (Certainly some people feel a 
moral obligation not to do so, especially, say, with regard to vul-
nerable small businesses.) But we need not go down that road, for 
the second reply is implicit in arguments already given. Consider 
the employee who absconds with the year’s profits. It is hardly a 
good defense to point out that exactly similar damage would have 
21 Id. at 39. 
22 Id. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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been caused had all customers legitimately withdrawn their busi-
ness this year. So it remains unclear how this argument shows that 
hurts caused by fair economic competition are not harms. Thus far, 
it appears that we will make no progress on this without appeal to 
consequentialist considerations: competition causes harm that is 
not different in kind to other sources of harm. Rather, it is differ-
ent in its consequences, and it is these consequences that serve as 
its justification. If this is right, then deontological libertarianism is 
in serious trouble. 
IV. THE SELF-OWNERSHIP ARGUMENT 
Arneson’s discussion of self-ownership, although critical in in-
tent, nevertheless gives the libertarian a clue about how to develop 
an alternative approach. If a consequentialist libertarian appeals to 
beneficial consequences, then a deontological libertarian ought to 
appeal to rights—specifically, rights of self-ownership. Any form of 
deontological libertarianism needs a foundational set of rights if it 
is to be able to set out a theory of what counts as acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. Some rights seem naturally to fall out of 
the libertarian concern for individual sovereignty, such as the right 
to life and to freedom from coercion by others. It appears, how-
ever, that a libertarian may set out his or her own catalog of the 
rights that constitute self-ownership. Any theory has to start 
somewhere, so a libertarian can start with a subtly nuanced portfo-
lio of rights. It seems, in principle, that this catalog can contain a 
right to engage in economic competition, but no right to be pro-
tected against it. 
Formally, there may appear to be one strong argument against 
this suggestion. Typically, libertarian rights of self-ownership are 
formulated as negative rights of non-interference: the right not to 
be assaulted, not to have one’s property taken without consent 
(unless it has been forfeited through acts that interfere with other 
people’s rights), or not to have one’s freedom of thought limited. 
The question is whether the freedom to enter any branch of eco-
nomic activity can be seen in the same way, and not as a positive 
right. This generates two, perhaps related, problems. The first is 
simply that it is out of philosophical character for a libertarian to 
appeal to positive rights or positive liberties. The second is that the 
great danger of positive rights and liberties is that they may clash WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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with the negative rights or liberties of others, and, within deonto-
logical libertarianism, there seems to be no way of adjudicating 
such disputes. 
It may seem, on the face of it, that both problems have a ready 
answer. The libertarian objects to those positive rights that create 
positive duties for others. The right to engage in any branch of 
economic activity is not of this sort. Indeed, it may be better con-
ceived as the right not to be stopped from engaging in any branch 
of economic activity, and thereby in essence it is a negative right. 
Formally, then, it seems possible to overcome the first objection. 
Yet this does not solve the second problem. As we saw, the exer-
cise of such economic freedom commonly does do harm to others 
by diminishing their financial prospects. Is this not, then, a para-
digm of the type of interference to which the libertarian objects? 
But, of course, the same appeal to a catalog of rights constituting 
self-ownership that sanctions free economic activity provides the 
answer: there never was a right to be protected against the effects 
of economic competition. So there is no right with which this per-
mission (conceived, we saw, as a prohibition on people stopping 
me from engaging in economic activity) will conflict. Any potential 
conflict is resolved in favor of the economic innovator—the new 
competitor—at the ground-floor level of defining the rights of self-
ownership. 
Although setting rules for philosophical debate is always diffi-
cult, and can seem a rather arrogant pretension, this proposal, it 
seems to me, has all the benefits of theft over honest toil, to use 
Bertrand Russell’s famous phrase. In this case the theft is from 
consequentialism. How remarkable it is that a deontological liber-
tarian should, through the exercise of pure reason, derive a set of 
rights that, in its approval of the free market, coincides with what 
his or her consequentialist colleagues can defend on the basis of ac-
tual arguments! The proposal to encode or embed an acceptance of 
free competition into the foundational rights of self-ownership 
looks like the smuggling of consequentialist considerations into the 
very foundations of deontological libertarianism. 
My argument, then, is not that I can refute the thesis that the 
rights of self-ownership automatically include the right to engage in 
economic competition, but rather that this is a somewhat disrepu-
table claim, made in a purely ad hoc way, to make deontological WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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libertarianism appear far more “capitalism friendly” than it really 
is. Rather than answering the challenge of this paper, the self-
ownership defense simply defines it out of existence. It fails to en-
gage the problem. 
 
V. THE “NO-ALTERNATIVE” RESPONSE 
 
Nevertheless, I doubt that those who favor deontological liber-
tarianism will feel much exercised by the arguments so far. In reply 
to the preceding argument, they may well say that any theory 
needs some undefended foundational assumptions, and these are 
the ones most suitable for deontological libertarianism (although I 
hope that they will have the grace to feel at least a little embar-
rassed in making this reply). Furthermore, they may say, what is 
the alternative to free competition except a centrally planned 
economy, in which spheres of economic activity are centrally allo-
cated? If this is the only choice, it should not be too difficult to find 
deontological libertarian reasons, of a perfectly ordinary and non-
question-begging form, for favoring free competition over plan-
ning. 
There is, of course, a question of whether this is an adequate de-
fense, even if it is true that there are deontological liberal reasons 
that speak in favor of free competition over central planning. As a 
preliminary matter, however, we can note that it is simply not true 
that these are the only two alternatives. We can posit a third alter-
native by considering how libertarians argue that property should 
be distributed. 
Any theory of justice that does not suppose everything is com-
monly owned must answer the question of how property is to be 
placed in individual hands. This is the issue of first appropriation or 
initial acquisition of private property. Once more, a deontological 
libertarian will have a more restricted set of options than those 
who are prepared to accept consequentialist reasoning. There are 
various libertarian proposals, but at the core of a number of liber-
tarian schemes resides essentially a single idea: the right of the first 
claimant, hedged, perhaps, by some other necessary conditions. 
Now, if libertarians are prepared to distribute land in this way, why 
not distribute forms of economic activity this way too? That is, 
whoever is the first to produce goods of a certain kind should have WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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an exclusive right to do so, just as the first person to work a piece 
of land is given the exclusive right to determine how that land is to 
be used. 
Under this model, one of the rights to non-interference the 
minimal state would enforce would be the right not to have other 
people encroach on one’s economic activity. This is a system little 
discussed in contemporary political philosophy, but well known to 
historians. It is called “feudalism.” I do not, of course, mean serf-
dom, but rather the system of monopoly, by which the right to pro-
duce a certain type of good is protected.
23 This form of feudalism 
violates one of the key assumptions of the model of the perfectly 
competitive economy—no entry barriers. Indeed, it replaces it with 
the opposite: full entry barriers. Admittedly, in practice the point 
of such monopolies was to raise revenue for the king, or feudal 
lord, and so monopolies were granted only to those prepared to 
pay for the privilege. However, this does not detract from the main 
point, that it is perfectly possible to have a system where spheres of 
economic activity are granted to the first to claim them.
24 Indeed, 
we see vestiges of this in patent systems, to which we will return 
very shortly, as well as the granting of special licenses for such 
things as telecom bandwidth, casinos, postal services, regulated 
professions, and so on. 
Clearly, there will be disadvantages with this system when gen-
eralized over the whole economy, especially from the point of view 
of the consumer; this, no doubt, is why feudalism died out. But 
whether these are disadvantages that can be based on reasons 
available to the pure deontological libertarian is a different ques-
tion. Certainly, to repeat a point already made several times, for 
23 See, e.g., Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution 1603–1714, at 25 (W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1982) (1961) (“It is difficult for us to picture to ourselves the life of a 
man living in a house built with monopoly bricks, with windows (if any) of monopoly 
glass; heated by monopoly coal (in Ireland monopoly timber), burning in a grate 
made of monopoly iron. His walls were lined with monopoly tapestries. He slept on 
monopoly feathers, did his hair with monopoly brushes and monopoly combs.”). 
Hill’s list goes on and on, incorporating soap, buttons, lobsters, lute-strings, candles, 
books, mousetraps, and many other items. Id. He notes that in 1621, there were said 
to be 700 such monopolies in England. Id. at 25–26. 
24 Clearly, some means of distinguishing spheres of economic activity will be neces-
sary, but there is no reason to think that this is an insuperable difficulty. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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such a libertarian, no justification starting from premises based on 
efficiency or utility can be employed. 
I am not pretending that feudalism is a superior scheme to free 
competition. It is, however, interesting to note that it is superior in 
certain ways consonant with libertarian ideas, and with some 
strands of current economic practice. Note, though, that there are 
two quite different ways that a monopoly can be granted, and both 
are used in contemporary economic systems: patent systems and a 
pure monopoly. A patent system gives the owner the right to li-
cense others to produce that good, whereas a pure monopoly is not 
assignable. Both protect the monopoly holder from economic 
competition, but a patent system is consistent with competition be-
tween those that are licensed by the patent holder, at the discretion 
of the patent holder. 
Consequently, we need to consider two alternatives to the free 
market and the centrally planned economy: (1) feudalism of pat-
ents, and (2) feudalism of pure monopoly. Such schemes have 
some intellectual attraction. If one thinks of the designer of a new 
scheme of economic activity as an inventor, then it may seem en-
tirely appropriate to think that the inventor should have some sort 
of intellectual property right over what he or she has devised. If 
one can stake a claim at the land frontier, should not a libertarian 
allow one to stake his claim at the frontier of ideas? Indeed, if any-
thing, the case looks stronger for intellectual property. In the case 
of land, something must change its status from no one’s property to 
someone’s property—a notoriously difficult transition. For intellec-
tual property, however, no similar transition is needed. 
There are vexed issues here. Take, for example, the modern dis-
cussion of gene-patenting. Mixed in are issues of public utility, in-
centives, rights of discoverers, rights of possessors, and others en-
gaged in similar work. Nevertheless, the idea of intrinsic 
intellectual property rights is part of the discussion, and there 
seems to be some sort of natural justice to the idea that those who 
have made a discovery have a greater claim to exploit it than oth-
ers. Or, at least, if anyone should say this, then a deontological lib-
ertarian should. Having said that, it is hard to see, for such a liber-
tarian, what arguments there might be on the other side. 
To recap, I have argued that the deontological libertarian owes 
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theft and arson, but not to protection against similar damage 
caused by economic competition. No appeal can be made to conse-
quentialist, efficiency, or, for that matter, social justice grounds. No 
simple appeal to liberty will help either. Plus, it cannot be said that 
we are unable to imagine a system that embodies such protections, 
for a system either of pure monopoly or of permanent patents 
would do the trick. I have further suggested that such a system 
seems to comport well with a libertarian view of private property. 
So we have the intermediate conclusion that deontological liber-
tarians should have argued for a form of feudalism, rather than 
capitalism. This may seem absurd. But that is not my problem. 
VI. THE LOCKEAN PROVISO RESPONSE 
The libertarian, however, still has at least one promising reply to 
this argument. Remember that the libertarian view of property, at 
least in Nozick’s hands, is not merely the right of the first claimant: 
some version of the Lockean proviso is also necessary.
25 The 
counterargument, then, will be that the type of feudal monopoly 
under consideration violates the Lockean proviso in its adverse ef-
fects on those who do not find themselves with a lucrative monop-
oly, and if this is so, libertarianism is not consistent with the form 
of protected monopoly as discussed in this Essay. It is easy to see 
how the argument goes: while individual private property in land 
meets the Lockean proviso, individual private property in a sphere 
of economic activity fails to meet the proviso, and so arguments for 
monopoly cannot be modeled on arguments for land. 
Clearly, it is important to investigate this in detail. The key ques-
tion is whether the Lockean proviso can be formulated in such a 
way as to bring out this disanalogy. The Lockean proviso comes in 
various strengths and forms. Its strongest formulation, which may 
be stronger than even Locke intended, suggests that appropriation 
is only acceptable if each act of appropriation leaves “enough, and 
as good” for others to appropriate.
26 Such a strong form will be 
very rarely satisfied, however, especially on a strict reading of “as 
good,” where geographical location such as proximity to markets is 
25 See Nozick, supra note 1, at 174–82 (discussing the Lockean proviso). 
26 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 291 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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included as a factor. Thus, a weaker interpretation is needed if the 
proviso is not to backfire and rule out private property. 
The most common response is to weaken the proviso so that it 
refers, ultimately, to the idea that appropriation must not make 
non-appropriators worse off. This leads us to the notorious prob-
lem of the baseline: worse off than what? Much discussion of this 
looks at the issue of whether it is possible to defend an account of 
the baseline that appears to be fair to non-appropriators.
27 How-
ever, given that I am presently engaged in exploring whether liber-
tarian arguments can deliver libertarian institutions, external con-
siderations of fairness are not the issue. Rather, we need to see if 
there is a version of the proviso that will protect the type of prop-
erty rights libertarians generally favor. Hence we need to explore 
how libertarians can understand what it means to obey the proviso 
that people are to be made “no worse off.” This proviso is not vio-
lated merely by the fact that there is no land left to appropriate. It 
could be, for example, that the new opportunity to work as a day 
laborer leaves a landless person no worse off than they would have 
been with a small plot of land. 
But still, we need to know: worse off than what? Here, the sali-
ent point is that there are two ways of understanding this compari-
son: the “local” and the “global.” The local reading is that each in-
dividual appropriation must leave everyone else no worse off than 
they would have been without that particular appropriation. If a 
farmer relies on a path over common land to take his goods to 
market, then he will be made worse off if part of this common land 
is appropriated and he now has to go the long way around.
28 The 
local reading provides a heavy burden, and may well prove difficult 
to meet. Anyone’s appropriation is likely to make a least one per-
son worse off in an uncompensated way. The global reading, by 
contrast, is that each person must be no worse off than they would 
have been had there been no system of individual appropriation at 
all. In this case the farmer can hardly complain, since he receives 
great benefits from the system of private property. Hence if the 
Lockean proviso is not to rule out most, if not all, private property 
27 See Nozick, supra note 1, at 177; see also G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, freedom, 
and equality 80–91 (1995).  
28 For the purposes of this argument, I ignore the point that competition with a sec-
ond farmer might cut into my revenue. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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claims, it has to be interpreted in global fashion. The test is simply 
whether I am worse off for the general system of appropriation of 
land than I would have been without it. If I am worse off, then I 
have a justified complaint.
29  
Accordingly, we need to exercise some care in applying the pro-
viso to the case of monopoly of an economic sphere. Suppose I am 
the first person to work out how to cure leather, and thereby ac-
quire a monopoly right over this activity. Would that violate the 
proviso? Applying the local proviso may render this problematic. 
Where there is a monopoly, prices will be higher than otherwise, 
and this will also frustrate others that wish to cure and sell leather. 
Hence the local proviso will be violated. Yet, as we have already 
seen, the local proviso cannot be the correct one to apply anyway, 
as it would also rule out private property. We must, therefore, ex-
plore whether the global version is also violated. That is, a libertar-
ian may claim that, as many will be worse off for the existence of a 
monopoly as opposed to free entry to trade, the Lockean proviso is 
violated. Furthermore, a libertarian might argue that since com-
pensation would be so broadly required and expensive, the only so-
lution is to abolish monopolies altogether. 
The opponent of libertarianism might respond that this is a dan-
gerous argument for the libertarian to use. For what goes for pro-
fessions must also go for land. If the Lockean proviso rules out 
monopolizing trade, then surely it must rule out monopolizing 
land. So, if I am worse off for being excluded from all occupied 
professions, then it seems likely that I will be worse off for being 
excluded from all occupied land. Conversely, then, if the libertar-
ian tells the landless to work for the landed, we can say the same to 
those who are not permitted to trade in their own right: go and 
work for someone else.
30 Thus, it is hard to see why the issues of 
land ownership and sphere-of-economic-activity ownership should 
not run in parallel. 
29 For a defense of this paragraph as a reading of Nozick, see Jonathan Wolff, 
Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State 111–12 (1991). 
30 This assumes, of course, that “selling unskilled labor” is not a sphere of economic 
activity to which one person can claim an exclusive license. This general permissibility 
would seem derivable from rights of self-ownership. Highly skilled, or differentiated, 
labor may be a different case. WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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Once again, the libertarian may well have a response. The effi-
ciency argument for individual private property can be used as an 
argument to show that it will make the worst off better off. But, in 
the case of monopolies of professions, it will be claimed, the effi-
ciency considerations work the other way around: that is, efficiency 
speaks against monopolizing professions. This is a hard argument 
to assess. No one would now argue that a feudal system is more ef-
ficient in utilitarian terms than free competition, but that argument 
is not available to the deontological libertarian. The only question 
is whether a system of monopoly production makes the worst off 
worse off than they would be without it. And how would they be 
without it? In a system of free trade, we cannot say. This is because 
free trade involves economic competition, and economic competi-
tion harms the interests of those who lose. Therefore, we have 
come full circle. A system of free trade is not a neutral baseline for 
comparison. We cannot use the system involving economic compe-
tition as the baseline against which we judge whether monopoly 
makes people worse off when we lack any justification for eco-
nomic competition. Hence it is simply unclear whether feudalism—
monopoly production—follows from libertarian assumptions, or is 
ruled out by them. 
CONCLUSION 
Let us suppose that the libertarian is right that monopoly pro-
duction is ruled out by the Lockean proviso. Where does this leave 
us? I have argued that the libertarian must show that the damage 
caused by economic competition is permissible, that it is not real 
harm. This, I suggested, could not be done without appeal to con-
sequentialist reasoning. Nevertheless, I noted that the libertarian 
will not be much exercised by this, thinking that the only two alter-
natives are capitalism and central planning, and that the latter can 
easily be ruled out on libertarian grounds. I provisionally suggested 
that this was a mistake: there is a third option, feudalism, which 
appears to comport well with libertarianism. But we have now seen 
that it may well be that feudalism can also be ruled out on libertar-
ian grounds. Does this mean, then, that the link between libertari-
anism and capitalism is re-established? 
A moment’s reflection makes clear that this is not the case. If 
libertarianism rules out central planning and feudalism, it does not WOLFF_BOOK  10/22/2006  3:55 PM 
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follow that this shows that it is consistent with free market capital-
ism. We have already seen, right from the beginning, that it is not: 
it has no resources for explaining why one type of damage is to be 
protected by law and another is not. So deontological libertarian-
ism is not consistent with any sort of economy that we know. Even 
if, as is unclear, deontological libertarianism can rescue itself from 
entanglement with feudalism, this does not reconcile it with capi-
talism. 
The key issue is to explain why we should not have rights to be 
protected from the losses consequent on economic competition. I 
have not found any explanation that a deontological libertarian can 
draw upon for support. Perhaps there are arguments I have missed. 
If so, I would like to see them. In their absence, however, I must 
conclude that deontological libertarians are unable to justify the 
libertarian institution of the free market; that is, unless they dis-
honestly smuggle consequentialist considerations into the defini-
tion of rights of self-ownership. Libertarian rights form a founda-
tion for no known economic system. 
 